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Tuesday
Jan262016

Oil and U.S. Stock Market

An introductory note from Sean Gross: The following commentary, written by David Kotok (Chairman & Chief Investment Officer at Cumberland Advisors: www.cumber.com), offers a historical analysis of stock market returns following periods of significant oil price declines.  David’s comments, reprinted with permission, are selectively quoted. The full text of David’s commentary can be found here.  Please feel free to contact us directly with any questions you may have about this article and/or your accounts: 509- 509-664-8844/ Info@TelosWealth.com

Oil and U.S. Stock Market
January 25, 2016

Hartford Funds has published an analysis of “stock market returns after significant oil price declines.” They used the WTI crude oil price reference and examined a period of approximately 30 years ending in 2015. In their examination they found four events that were substantive. Independently, Jim Bianco published a similar analysis and brought the data current through January 20, 2016. We commend both firms on their excellent work.
 
The first event was the oil price drop that took place between October 1985 and March 1986. Hartford’s analysis indicated a price drop of approximately 66%. They then computed the S&P 500 Index total return one year after the price decline period ended. The result was a positive 37.66%.
 
The next period was September 1990 through February 1991. The oil price decline was 53% (57% if you use Bianco’s dating). According to Hartford’s computations, the subsequent S&P 500 Index total return one year after the price decline was complete was 15.99%.
 
The third event was December 1996 through November 1998. The oil price drop was 56%. Bianco uses a slightly different methodology and has the price drop at 61%. The S&P 500 Index total return one year after the price decline was 20.90%.
 
The last of the four events was June 2008 through January 2009. The oil price drop was 70% according to Hartford. Bianco gets 78% for that decline. Hartford computes that the S&P 500 Index total return one year after the price decline was 33.14%.
 
In their research note, Hartford asks a serious question. What will happen after the current oil price decline runs its course? And, of course, what will be the price and total return of the S&P 500 Index one year after the price decline is complete?
 
According to Hartford’s calculation, during the period June 2014 through December 2015, the oil price drop was 65%. Jim Bianco data now shows 73% from peak to trough. In fact, depending on how you measure the oil price, the price decline this time could be the largest percentage drop in history. It may exceed the 70% decline that occurred in 2008 and 2009.

Will this oil price decline run its course? Yes, absolutely. At what price will it bottom? Not a single soul on the planet knows. What will happen after the bottom? History suggests that the transmission mechanism of low oil price to positive economic outcome, with rising consumption and other stimulative effects, takes about a year to unfold.
 
The historical data also suggests that once the positive rebound begins to unfold, it will become robust as a result of the $200 billion annual tax cut equivalent from the energy price fall. The 350 million of us who live in America and billions who live around the world have been receiving and will continue to receive this benefit.
 
After we rebalance our household balance sheets, raise our savings, and adjust our domestic budgets, we will start to spend this windfall. There are early signs that this process is underway. Subsequently, we will find ourselves with an extra $20 to $100 a week in our pockets. As we begin to realize the permanence of the excess, it becomes spendable. Economists call this the permanent income hypothesis.
  
A drop in the oil price has immediate effects on credit, including high-yield and energy-related credit, and on regions of the country that are dependent on energy production, such as North Dakota and Texas. It is a negative force and quickly visible. We can already see it and measure its impact.
 
The oil price transmission mechanism that affects the entire nation and passes through the benefits of the price drop takes more time to operate and is more nuanced. We are starting to see those benefits now, and they are accelerating.
 
This analysis leads us to the following conclusions:
 
(1) We are not going to have a recession in the US. We are going through the negative phase of the energy price shock. The positive phase is still ahead of us; however, it has begun.
 
(2) The positive phase is likely to continue and become more robust. There is an accelerator function in the transmission from oil price decline to economic growth.
 
(3) There is no way to know how high the S&P 500 Index will go once the oil price downward shock is complete, nor can we time the upturn. There is a lot of history and supportive information to suggest that following the oil price shock, the US economy will be more robust. Our growth rate will pick up and do so from a platform that is fairly solid, because the economy will have run through the credit problems precipitated by the downward move in oil. Lastly, the rebound will be reflected in an upward movement in stock prices and higher total returns, with a strongly positive number from the S&P 500 Index.
 
Factoring in low global inflation and additional intervention by central banks worldwide, from the European Central Bank to the People’s Bank of China, we see the makings of an extended period – through the rest of the decade – with low single-digit interest rates, low inflation, ample liquidity, and a corrective mechanism that will express itself in rising asset prices as we go through this turmoil and come out the other side.
  
When the oil price spikes down, the plunge creates turmoil. Then the oil price bottoms and the recovery creates massive opportunity.

 

David R. Kotok, Chairman and Chief Investment Officer, Cumberland Advisors

Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve certain risks and uncertainties, which are difficult to predict. All indices are unmanaged, and investors cannot invest directly in an index. Unlike investments, indices do not incur management fees, charges, or expenses. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

                                                                                         ###

Sean Gross, CFP®, AIF® | Co-Founder & CEO
Sean Gross, CFP®, AIF® is the Co-Founder and CEO of Telos Wealth Management, LLC, a Registered Investment Adviser located at 656 North Miller St., Wenatchee, WA. Sean can be reached at 509-664-8844 or at Info@TelosWealth.com.

 

 

Friday
Jan152016

Will a 2007 – 2009 Redux Occur in 2016?

An introductory note from Sean Gross: The following commentary was written by Gabriel Hament, Foundation and Charitable Accounts, and David Kotok, Chairman & Chief Investment Officer, at Cumberland Advisors (www.cumber.com). Their commentary, reprinted with permission, offers a detailed and helpful analysis of whether the recent sell-off in global risk assets is a precursor to something worse (i.e., a repeat of the 2007–2009 global financial collapse), or a temporary downturn, which will eventually be followed by a significant upturn. Please feel free to contact us directly with any questions you may have about this article and/or your accounts: 509-509-664-8844/Info@TelosWealth.com 

The “Greenspan Put” or the “Yellen Bid”?

January 15, 2016
 
In his recent dispatch on the daily market gyrations, Art Cashin relays to us the various rumors swirling around on the exchange floor. Art’s reasons for the red paint on the tape include:

  • Sovereign wealth funds forced to liquidate due to currency/oil sell-offs
  • Hedge funds putting to bid stock positions in order to cover losses in their commodity positions
  • Heavy sell programs triggering margin calls 

Will the carnage across asset classes continue?
 
To answer this question, Art draws on the research of SentimenTrader’s Jason Goepfert. Jason notes that the “S&P 500 has now corrected 10% from a near 52-week high for the second time in a relatively short span… this has only happened three times in the last 100 years – 1929, 2000, and 2008. Additionally, 90% of volume has flowed into declining stocks.”
 
Jason assigns probabilities to three scenarios going forward:
 
1)   Oversold bounce: 50%
2)   Flush lower then bounce: 30%
3)   Outright collapse of 5%–15%: 20%
 
All three extreme events that Jason cites – 1929, 2000, and 2008 – share a common thread: serious deterioration in a sector of the credit markets. There is the source of the pain. The contraction of credit reverses the multiplicative power of credit.
 
Extreme sell-offs occur due to credit contraction. We see such sell-offs now in the high-yield space (e.g. Third Avenue) and in junk funds that own high-yield instruments. The prospectuses of multiple junk funds reveal that the high-yield securities include non-US debt with currency hedges or debt denominated in USD by those who cannot pay. 

Our previous commentary titled “Contagion Risk, Big Banks, Junk Funds” provides an in-depth analysis on which high-yield funds have upwards of 20% of their holdings in these types of issues. Some of these funds currently appear at the top of Morningstar’s rating lists.
 
However, a 2007–2009 redux will not occur in 2016. The underlying source of the credit that has dragged down the market originates from central banks. We believe the power of very low interest rates stretched over a long period of time will continue to fuel higher asset prices. A discount rate of zero, 1%, or even 2% results in very large numbers for asset pricing. Broad-based market sell-offs such as the one in which we find ourselves are set-ups for massive bull entry points.
 
Hope is not a strategy. And fear provides the entry signal.

Gabriel Hament, Foundation and Charitable Accounts

David R. Kotok, Chairman and Chief Investment Officer

Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve certain risks and uncertainties, which are difficult to predict. All indices are unmanaged, and investors cannot invest directly in an index. Unlike investments, indices do not incur management fees, charges, or expenses. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

###

Sean Gross, CFP®, AIF® | Co-Founder & CEO
Sean Gross, CFP®, AIF® is the Co-Founder and CEO of Telos Wealth Management, LLC, a Registered Investment Adviser located at 656 North Miller St., Wenatchee, WA. Sean can be reached at 509-664-8844 or at Info@TelosWealth.com.
Thursday
Apr162015

Document Retention Length Recommendations

Keep for 1–3 Months

  • Utility bills
  • Sales receipts for minor purchases
  • ATM and bank deposit slips

Keep for 1 Year

  • Checkbook ledgers
  • Paycheck stubs
  • Monthly mortgage statements
  • Expired insurance records

Keep for 7 Years

  • Bank statements
  • W-2 and 1099 forms
  • Receipts for tax purposes
  • Cancelled checks
  • Disability records
  • Unemployment income stubs
  • Medical bills/claims

Keep Indefinitely

  • Annual tax returns
  • Deeds, mortgages, and bills of sale
  • Year-end statements for investments
  • Legal documents (birth certificates, marriage license, divorce papers, passports, etc.)
  • Home improvement documentation and receipts
  • Receipts for major purchases—for warranty and insurance purposes
  • Wills
  • Living wills
  • Power of attorney designation
  • Medical and burial instructions
  • Beneficiary directions
  • Real estate certificates
  • Automobile titles
  • Current insurance policies
  • Medical records
  • Education records
  • Pension plan records
  • Retirement plan records

Shred/Trash

  • Paycheck stubs after reconciling with W-2 form
  • Expired warranties
  • Coupons after expiration date
Wednesday
Jan282015

ECB, Euro, USD, Interest Rates

An Introductory note from Sean Gross: The following commentary is authored by David Kotok, Chairman and Chief Investment Officer at Cumberland Advisors (www.cumber.com). David's commentary, reprinted with permission, offers a detailed and helpful analysis of the possible consequences of the long anticipated, and recently announced, European Central Bank (ECB) quantitative easing program (QE). Please feel free to contact us directly with any questions you may have: Info@TelosWealth.com.  

ECB, Euro, USD, Interest Rates
January 24, 2015

After a two-and-a-half-year wait for “whatever it takes,” the quantitative easing (QE) announced this week by the European Central Bank (ECB) is different from the QE undertaken by the Federal Reserve (Fed) during and after the financial crisis and now completed. The European action comes in the aftermath of the Fed’s programs and is a European attempt to confront complex economics. 

In the 2008–2014 Fed version, QE injected liquidity into markets that were frozen. More QE was then piled on as the Fed expanded its holdings of federally backed securities. A single sovereign guaranteed that debt, and that was the United States government.

The QE process quickly drove the short-term interest rate to zero but not below zero. Over time the longer-term interest rates followed a similar path to lower and lower levels. The reduction in interest rates translated to reduced mortgage and corporate-financing costs. The process has continued for seven years. A refinancing apparatus could then develop in the US economy as one agent after another took advantage of persistently lower interest rates. Lenders adjusted to the new notion of lower interest rates for longer periods. Investors were hit by financial repression as their savings instruments matured and rolled over into lower interest rates. That process is ongoing in 2015.

In the US, behaviors changed over the course of seven years. Positions that were initially viewed as being temporary started to seem permanent.

Forecasters warned, “The Fed is printing all this money; we’ll have a big inflation; interest rates will skyrocket; and the economy and markets will go in the tank.” The warnings were repeated ad infinitum in the media. They were debated by some.

Cumberland Advisors numbered among the debaters. We argued “no.” We were in the minority. Over and over again we heard predictions of hyperinflation and higher interest rates. We said “no.” We heard all of the outcomes that would be terrible as a result of QE. We said “no.” Seven years on, the debate continues, with the detractors predicting doom. Meanwhile, in the United States, interest rates are very low. There is minimal inflation. The economic recovery is strengthening. The American stock markets reached all-time highs within the last month. 

The detractors are still predicting the end of the world. Someday they may be correct. But not in January, 2015. At Cumberland we still say “no.” Not yet!

Seven years later in the US we can now add a major oil shock to the economic positives. With QE-induced refinancing in place and with growing intensity in our economic recovery, the outlook is simply marvelous. In 2015, our growth will be above 3%, employment will improve, and inflation will remain low. The positive trends continue and are becoming more robust. In addition, we have the world’s strongest major reserve currency, with a long run still ahead of it. And we have a better fiscal balance in the US than most nations enjoy.

In the US, QE was controversial and still is. Meanwhile, look at results. It worked.

Examine the same issues in the Eurozone and the ECB, and we see a different picture than in the US. 

The ECB will be acquiring over €1 trillion in sovereign debt. Their allocation method is quite different from the Fed’s. They have to deal with the sovereign debts of different countries that have different levels of creditworthiness, ranging from junk-bond status in Greece to the highest-grade status in Germany and Finland. There is no inflation and no expectation of inflation in the Eurozone. Interest rates for the debt of the very highest-grade sovereigns are already next to zero in the Eurozone. The same is true for nearby sovereigns like Sweden and for Switzerland. 

In all of Europe, interest rates on longer-term sovereign debt are remarkably low and mostly lower than in the US. Italy’s 10-year benchmark sovereign debt touched 1.4% on Friday. Spain reached 1.25%. In Germany, the sovereign benchmark for the Eurozone, the 30-year bond yield is 1%, and the 10-year note is 0.2%. All German maturities under 5 years are trading at negative yields. 

QE by the ECB will not lower interest rates — they are already at or near zero. In fact, the ECB has announced it will acquire sovereign debt even if the yield is negative. Think about that. The central bank will be creating money in order to pay the various sovereign governments for the privilege of buying their debt. That is how a negative interest rate works.

Meanwhile, the fiscal situation in Europe is still under repair, a process that will take many years. In countries like France, a great portion of the economy, more than half, is driven by the government. Italy is another case study of a huge burden of social promises and a deficient funding mechanism to pay for them. Greece is a mess without easy answers. Others in Europe no longer care whether Greece exits the Eurozone. Many hope that they do, because it is nearly impossible to throw any country out. Grexit (the term for a Greece exit from the Eurozone) would be welcomed by other peripheral countries, although the celebration in those countries would be a quiet one due to the observance of political correctness. 

To be blunt, the divisions in Europe cannot be healed by QE. The promises that are expensed as social benefit payments act to reduce productivity and restrain growth. This fiscal reality cannot be cured by QE. In fact, there is no liquidity shortage in Europe for QE to fix. QE is not a reform mechanism for euro-sclerosis. QE cannot cure sick governance. It cannot lower interest rates when they are at zero. It cannot stimulate credit expansion when there is no credit demand. If zero interest rates won’t work, a continuation of zero interest rates also won’t work.

So what does QE do?

In Europe, QE transfers the fiscal failure of the sovereign states involved to the monetary authority, the European Central Bank. The ECB creates money. The money is used to buy the sovereign debt of Eurozone members at an interest rate of zero or near-zero. The sovereign debt the ECB buys is likely to be held for years. It must be viewed as a permanent structure, just as it has become in Japan. The ECB will not be “tapering” in this decade. Maybe it will do so in the next decade. The proceeds of the issuance of sovereign debt will fund the social promises that governments cannot otherwise keep. Contrast that situation with that in the US, where the annualized government deficit is nearly $1 trillion smaller than it was at its worst in 2009.

In Europe, QE is a circular mechanism. It has no multiplier in the credit arena. It inspires no productivity gain from investment by the private sector. It is merely circular.

So, if it is circular, why have QE?

There is one element that works with QE, whether in the US or Europe. We have seen it work in the US, and we will see it work in Europe. QE withdraws duration from the market and transfers it onto the government’s books. The market then seeks to replace the duration in its asset mix. That is why asset prices rise when QE occurs: asset prices rise when duration is in demand, and they fall when duration is in supply. When central banks extract duration from the market, it has to be replaced with something else. Stocks are long-duration assets. Real estate is a long-duration asset. Collectibles and precious metals are long-duration assets. Patents and other forms of intellectual property rights are long-duration assets. Cash is not long-duration. The duration of cash is one day.

In the US, QE has resulted in record stock market prices. They are still rising. QE has resulted in higher real estate prices. They are still rising. QE adds to the upward direction of asset prices and the accumulation of wealth by the wealthy. We see it in the statistics that track wealth and in the statistics that are derived from the income streams owned by the wealthy.

Wealth effects operate with a time lag. There is a slight transfer each year from accumulated wealth into consumption spending and hence into economic growth. It is a small percentage. From a higher and rising stock market, we estimate that transfer to be 1%-2% in any given year. If stock market wealth rises and there is a positive and permanent wealth effect of $100 over the course of the year, an additional $1 to $2 in annual spending transfers slowly to economic growth. We see that at work in the US. We will see it at work in Europe as well.

There is a higher transfer when real estate prices rise and are viewed as permanently heading higher. The financing mechanism for housing has a multiplier that is greater than the financing mechanism applied to financial assets. That makes sense since the credit multiplier for housing is higher than for stocks. For example, stocks can sit in your 401(k) unleveraged, while houses are mortgaged and do not sit in 401(k)s. Therefore the transmission mechanism from higher housing wealth is more robust than the transmission mechanism from higher stock prices. Yale Professor Bob Shiller notes that housing wealth effects can reach 3% to 5% a year. We already see some of those effects in the US, thanks to QE. As housing becomes more robust, we will see more of the positive housing wealth effects in the US. We will see a little of this happening in the Eurozone.

The conclusion is that the extended and predictable period of QE in Europe will give some positive stimulus to economic growth via the wealth-effect transmission method. It will not be a panacea for Europe’s problems. Monetary policy cannot fix fiscal policy errors or the suppression of production by governments, but monetary policy can raise asset prices. In Europe it will do so. In the US it already has done so, and the rise is not over.

At Cumberland Advisors, we remain fully invested in the US stock market in our exchange-traded fund (ETF) strategies. We are focused on domestic businesses. Our largest overweight is the utility sector. It is 95% domestic, so its corporate entities do not have to worry about foreign currency translations impacting their earnings. The sector benefits from a slowly and steadily growing US economy. It pays dividend yields that exceed the riskless interest rate from Treasury notes. It is defensive and less volatile than other sectors in a period when volatility is rising. 

Our international ETF strategies have a majority of components that are currency hedged. Our outlook for the dollar is a prolonged period of strengthening. We expect a lot of adjustment vis-à-vis the other currencies that are involved in the present historic restructuring of monetary policy. Those currencies will weaken relative to the dollar. It is conceivable that the yen could reach 135 or 150 to the dollar over a period of several years. It is conceivable that the euro-dollar exchange rate could be 1.00, 0.90, or 0.85 over the next two or three years. The range of possibilities is unknown, and the confidence intervals on such estimates are very wide. 

Imagine a world where the US central bank policy rate is 1% and the Eurozone central bank policy rate is minus 0.2%. The math suggests that the dollar would then strengthen by 1.2% a year against the euro. Compare the current 10-year German Bund at 0.2% to the 10-year US note. The difference is 1.7%. That math suggests the dollar will strengthen 17% against the euro over the next 10 years. Please note that this is a very simplified model. The actual way this comparison is done is much more complex, but the concept is the same. Interest-rate differentials explain longer-term movements in currency exchange rates. 

We cannot fully estimate what euro-dollar exchange rates will be. The truth is, nobody knows.

We anticipate the volatilities associated with this massive transition in policy to reach new levels. That means lots of activity in managed portfolios and a need for the portfolio manager to be nimble and move quickly when required.

Volatility is bidirectional. It is scary when it causes prices to accelerate if they fall.  It is frightening at inflection points. And it is exhilarating when it enables prices to head upward. Expect all of the above in 2015.

David R. Kotok, Chairman and Chief Investment Officer

 ###

Sean Gross, CFP®, AIF® | Co-Founder & CEO
Sean Gross, CFP®, AIF® is the Co-Founder and CEO of Telos Wealth Management, LLC, a Registered Investment Adviser located at 656 North Miller St., Wenatchee, WA. Sean can be reached at 509-664-8844 or at Info@TelosWealth.com.
Wednesday
Jan222014

The Target and Neiman Marcus Incidents – A Call for Review?

An introductory note from Sean Gross: The following commentary is authored by Dr. Bob Eisenbeis, Vice Chairman and Chief Monetary Economist at Cumberland Advisors (www.cumber.com). Dr. Eisenbeis’ commentary, reprinted with permission, offers a detailed and helpful analysis of the crisis of confidence following recent revelations of sophisticated credit and debit card hacking scams, perpetrated by criminals through the electronic payment systems of large retailers. Please feel free to contact us directly with any questions: Info@TelosWealth.com.

 

The recent disclosures by Target and Neiman Marcus of the theft of millions of customers’ credit and debit card information and related personal information raise many public policy issues, stretching far beyond the immediate incidents that need to be addressed. At their core is the need to ensure the integrity of the nation’s payment system in the digital age, when not only financial institutions but also retail and other businesses are electronically intertwined and potentially exploitable via the internet.

Unfortunately, most of the legal and regulatory structure in this area is geared to the 1960s version of how people made payments. Credit card transactions were essentially paper-based, as were checks. Merchants cleared and settled credit card transactions through processors and the credit card companies (large batch files were then delivered to banks), and paper checks were cleared between banks in local clearinghouses or through the Federal Reserve. Now paper checks are on the decline, and there are essentially no substantive differences between how credit card and debit card transactions are initiated (transactions take place at the same point-of-sale terminals), accepted or processed, except for minor differences such as requiring a pin number in some cases for a debit card transaction. Additionally, now that checks are being truncated at the point of sale or being digitized as part of the clearing process, they too become electronically based and potentially hackable. As a consequence, virtually all transactions are now electronically based or are quickly converted from paper into electronic form. Consumer transactions at the point of sale are typically authorized in real time; holds are placed on accounts at banks; and merchants and businesses accumulate the actual transactions data throughout the day, which are then bulk transferred electronically to the bank or intermediate processor.

Despite the functional and technical similarities between credit and debit cards, there are in fact different customer liability rules for each because they evolved separately and historically were processed in different ways. For credit cards, consumers are liable for only the first $50 of unauthorized transactions, and there is no liability if the transaction takes place over the internet. In the internet credit card transaction no physical card is presented to the seller and the collected information is very much like that taken from Target.  It is already clear that some of the information stolen from Target has been used on the internet. Perpetrators first make a small transaction, which, if successful, is quickly followed with attempts at larger purchases.

In contrast to credit cards, there is a sliding liability scale for debit cards, depending upon how quickly a consumer notifies his or her bank of a lost card. There is no liability if the bank is notified immediately and no unauthorized transactions have taken place; there is a $50 liability if the customer notifies the bank within two business days; there is a $500 liability if the bank is notified after two days but within 60 days, and unlimited liability thereafter. Despite the legal differences between credit and debit cards, some banks have waived some or all of these provisions; but in the Target case, only a few banks have reissued cards and deactivated en masse the accounts that had been compromised. Note that the customer’s legal liability is based upon what the customer does or does not do if a card is lost. Liability typically stops once the card loss is reported to the bank.

In the Target and Neiman Marcus situations, cards weren’t lost; customers didn’t know that their identities and card information had been breached, so they clearly face no liability for unauthorized transactions. As such, the main consumer issues in this case center on the prospective problems that result from stolen key identity information, not on liability for unauthorized transactions. Consumers will surely incur the inconvenience costs of closely monitoring their accounts, reporting unauthorized transactions, and dealing the uncertainty of when and how the stolen information may be used, if not immediately, then perhaps sometime in the future.

When such thefts occur, the current applicable legal and investigatory responsibilities are fragmented. At the federal level, the investigatory authority lies with the Secret Service, which is responsible for counterfeiting, financial fraud, and internet fraud, although the FBI sometimes gets involved as well. Prosecutory decisions, however, are decentralized and lie with the various US states attorneys general; and because of resource constraints, few cases are actually brought to a grand jury. This problem alone means that the risks that perpetrators incur by engaging in such activity are relatively low, even if the perpetrators are caught.

In addition to the Secret Service, local authorities can also be involved. The classic example was the 2004 theft of data from ChoicePoint, a Georgia company that provided data aggregation of confidential personal information that was then sold to businesses. In September 2004 the company discovered the theft of data in Southern California. The company reported the theft to local authorities, as it was required to do under California state law; but ChoicePoint did not disclose the theft to the individuals whose data had been taken. In fact, local law enforcement officials told ChoicePoint not to notify customers because of its ongoing investigation. It wasn’t until February 2005 that notification began, and the initial notifications were expanded significantly in response to public outrage. The total number of accounts was small by today’s standards, amounting to about 135,000.   

What should have been clear is that the ChoicePoint theft raised broader concerns than those perceived by local Southern California law officials. Moreover, the crime was not one in which local law enforcement officials had particular expertise. Finally, since ChoicePoint was a Georgia company and operated across state lines, the breach was also investigated by the FTC, the SEC, and several US states attorneys general. What presented itself was a situation involving multiple overlapping legal authorities, some with little expertise in payments or problems related to identity theft, few resources for enforcement, and no overarching law governing what was clearly a national incident because of the scope of the loss exposure. Consumers were left to their own devices not only with regard to becoming informed but also with regard to re-establishing their identities.

More recently, firms involved in the payments processing business have even begun to purchase insurance against such breaches. However, sometimes insurance can cover only a small portion of the losses. In the case of the 2012 data breach experienced by Global Payments, Inc., the theft of data for somewhere between 1 million and 7 million cards has already cost the company $93 million; and as of January 2013, Global Payments expected to incur another $25 to $35 million in costs through 2013. Insurance covered only about $28 million of the losses. If the Global Payments breach in fact involved 7 million cards, then by analogy the losses in the Target case might reach 10 times or more the amount incurred by Global Payments.

The potential for mega fraud losses has escalated sharply with the recent explosion of the internet, which now provides a potential window into the data of millions and millions of citizens’ personal information. Such remote access can enable anyone – even far removed from the United States – to obtain credit and other pertinent information and use that information to steal funds. The experience of Target shows that, when such information is compromised, consumers will quickly stop transacting business at that enterprise and request cancellation and reissuance of their credit and debit cards – another form of a run on the payments system.

Consumer reactions can not only undermine the integrity of the payment medium but also create additional costs, not only to firms like Target but to the financial institutions that must deal with the losses, sort out consumer identity problems, and reissue millions of cards. Indeed, because of the data linkages between nonfinancial and financial institutions, a data theft and subsequent exploitation holds the potential to threaten the solvency of a financial institution if the resulting unauthorized transactions are large and concentrated. To date, these vulnerabilities have not been the focus of bank examiners or of those concerned with systemic risk. These recent thefts point to the vulnerability of the present system and to the systemic linkages that exist across both non-bank financial institutions and banks.      

When such breaches occur, the allocation of losses becomes critical. Presently, loss allocation is confusing and only imperfectly defined as far as consumers are concerned and is not defined at all for non-financial businesses like they are for banks and credit card companies under current law or federal regulations. Indeed, while the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has wide regulatory responsibility for consumer credit cards, it has no similar authority over business cards.

In terms of losses to businesses from data breaches, there may or may not be agreements between counterparties, but the already publicized disputes between Target and banks suggest there were not. To protect their business models, many banks are covering all consumer losses, even though they are not required to do so by law, in an attempt to insure the integrity of payments. But how much of the banks’ losses will ultimately be forced on Target or Neiman Marcus is uncertain. Already there are contentious disagreements over who owes whom for what and one can envision a raft of class action suits by customers and financial institutions alike. Some have already been filed. For investors, this situation represents a heretofore unappreciated risk, seemingly unrelated to the core business of the enterprise. Financial institutions that incurred losses must now turn to the courts for redress (unless existing contracts had anticipated such problems), which is a lengthy and costly process.     

The points of vulnerability are many, especially since many institutions have outsourced the actual processing and warehousing of data, and this trend is accelerating as more and more businesses move their computing into the cloud. Indeed, there are many potential weak links, beginning with the consumer at his or her desktop and extending to large businesses and merchants who collect and aggregate transactions data for deferred processing and maintain customer information, to payments intermediaries like Paypal, to specialized exchanges and automated clearinghouses for data, and finally, to banks themselves. Indeed, the littered trail along which people have left payments information covers a wide range of business from retailers, to airlines to online stores to car rental companies – the list is very large. So, while banks at the end of the chain may have very sophisticated methods to identify fraudulent transactions, there are still many points of entry through which potential damage can be done; thus the vulnerabilities are great. 

The Target breach raises many policy issues that extend far beyond this specific incident. The risk is that Congress – which has already indicated it will hold hearings on the breach – will rush to judgment and pass legislation to protect consumers without full appreciation or consideration of the broader issues. Indeed, the most significant issues are not related to consumers at this point. Consumers are essentially protected from loss, although not from inconvenience due to uncertainty, loss of ability to use their cards, and concern about other unauthorized use of their information. 

The overarching issues concern threats to the payment system itself and the risks that breached information will be used to commit wholesale electronic theft that might threaten the solvency of a major financial institution, be it a bank, investment bank, insurance company, etc. Additionally, such insolvency could have systemic implications for the financial system as a whole. The systemic risks are further amplified by the complex interrelationships among traditional business firms, operators of the private-sector payments-transfer infrastructure, and financial firms. A hack of customer data held by a nonfinancial firm or payments processor could result in losses that can quickly bleed over into the financial system if data are compromised and transactions are initiated and consummated before the breach is discovered or reported. While this scenario may sound farfetched to some, major US corporations accumulate and store huge volumes of transactions and personal information; and it is not clear that they have the same kinds of fraud detection and protections as major financial institutions do. Additionally, these firms engage in significant cash management activities that involve the financing of short-term holdings of assets that are rolled over frequently. If those rollovers were disrupted or suddenly diverted by an outside compromise of the company’s computer resources, those flows could generate significant risks for financial institutions involved in those financings. It goes without saying that small community and regional banks are likely to be even more vulnerable since they can’t afford the sophisticated systems that large institutions have installed. Perhaps even more fundamental is the risk that, should their data be compromised, the public will lose confidence in the electronic payment systems, which would represent a huge shock to the financial system. Lastly, we can’t minimize the threat that terrorists or a rogue foreign government might intentionally breach a financial or nonfinancial institution’s systems and cause its collapse.           

Given the magnitude of the potential damage that data breaches could visit on the US financial infrastructure, the question is, what should be done? Obviously, before any legislative actions are taken, the issues and risks need to be clearly identified. One logical step toward that end would be to convene another fact-finding and study commission along the lines of the 1970s Hunt Commission (Electronic Funds Commission) to gauge the dimensions of the problem. The commission should be charged with identifying potential risks, recommending changes in security measures that financial and nonfinancial firms should make, considering what role the Federal Reserve should play (because of its current involvement in electronic payments and large scale funds transfer systems like Fed Wire), proposing loss-sharing rules to eliminate uncertainty and costly litigation, reviewing and making recommendations to modernize federal rules regarding debt and credit transactions, and considering what efforts should be undertaken internationally to curb unscrupulous use of the internet. In fact, given that there is already more than one internet, the commission should consider the feasibility of creating a separate commercial internet with limited and supervised access, like a restricted access toll road. The commission should be broadly representative and include participants from a wide range of banks, retailers, internet-reliant companies, including the large players like Amazon, Google, Apple, etc., and perhaps even representatives from the NSA (an agency that certainly knows how to penetrate and hack systems). The issues are many, deep, and far-reaching and can only be suggested here. But as a nation we should be proactive and seize the opportunity to address the issues now in order to reduce potentially grave vulnerabilities.           

From the perspective of investors, as mentioned previously, the Target episode certainly will result in losses, and lawsuits have already been filed. Target’s stock price dropped 4 points after the true scope and nature of the data breaches were revealed. Processors and data partners of Target will surely also face similar litigation and losses. The event highlights a risk that clearly has not been on investors’ minds. Such uncertainty implies more volatility, especially for the more vulnerable segments of the payments process and infrastructure.

Bob Eisenbeis, Vice Chairman & Chief Monetary Economist

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Sean Gross, CFP®, AIF® | Co-Founder & CEO
Sean Gross, CFP®, AIF® is the Co-Founder and CEO of Telos Wealth Management, LLC, a Registered Investment Adviser located at 656 North Miller St., Wenatchee, WA. Sean can be reached at 509-664-8844 or at Info@TelosWealth.com.